A Light-Weight White-Box Encryption Scheme for Securing Distributed Embedded Devices

Shridevi V; Veerendra Dakulagi

Shridevi V Student, Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Guru Nanak dev Engineering College Bidar, Karnataka
Veerendra Dakulagi Associate Professor and Dean, Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Guru Nanak dev Engineering College Bidar, Karnataka, India

Abstract

Embedded devices distributed widely in sensor networks and the Internet of Things is used to collect and send data. Many of them are deployed unattended (for example, sensor nodes and tag readers), while others can be easily lost (for example, bracelets and smart watches). This distributed hardware can be captured and accessed unauthorized due to its physical nature. From a security perspective, they generally work in the context of a white square attack, where opponents have full visibility of deployed cryptographic systems deployments and full control over their implementations. Undoubtedly, it is a big challenge to deal with white box attacks on these devices. Current encryption algorithms for white box attack contexts require a large amount of memory space and are therefore unsuitable for embedded devices with limited resources. To meet this challenge, we suggest a new lightweight encryption plan to protect data confidentiality. Encryption is done using specialized confidential components, and the encryption algorithm requires a small amount of static data to store critical information. Also, this scheme supports only effective key update at a very small COST. The safety and cost of the proposed scheme have been theoretically analyzed with positive results, and extensive empirical assessments indicate that the new scheme meets the requirements of distributed hardware combined in terms of limited memory usage and low arithmetic cost.

How to cite this article:
Shridevi, Dakulagi V. A Light-Weight White-Box Encryption Scheme for Securing Distributed Embedded Devices. J Adv Res Embed Sys 2020; 7(3&4): 24-28.

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